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8 April 1966

PAKISTAN'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

By

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(Thesis)

Pakistan's Search for Identity

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

Review of the history of the area now known as Pakistan provides insight into the ancient Hindu culture and that of its Muslim conquerors, enabling a more complete understanding of current differences between India and Pakistan. When the British gained control of the Indian subcontinent, they divided it into two kinds of political units. Provinces were directly under British rule, but princely states, constituting the other political division, were headed by hereditary Indian rulers who acknowledged paramountcy of the government of India. This dichotomy later produced disputes which still seem insolvable.

Nationalism flourished in South Asia during the early twentieth century and gradually diverged into opposing Hindu and Muslim groups. The Muslims of India were not willing to accept independence within a united India where Hindus would hold a majority. Consequently, they sought and precipitately obtained the establishment of two dominions in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan, with boundaries generally determined on the basis of the majority religious composition of the population.

Communal disorders accompanying partition caused the death of a half million or more people and the migration of some twelve million. Pakistan was, indeed, virtually shattered before it became a nation; and relations with India deteriorated to a condition of armed conflict when disagreements concerning the princely states, division of assets and military stores of British India, and evacuee property all seemed to defy solution.

Tasks which faced the new state of Pakistan were gigantic. The unique geography of the divided country added to the difficulties of a determined people, ill-equipped to establish a new government. Despite an economic structure which was almost totally disrupted and lacking in natural resources, Pakistan made slow but remarkable progress in implementing sound economic planning. United States' assistance made this possible and aided substantially in modernization of the military forces of the new country.

Relations with India have continually dominated the foreign policy of Pakistan. Control of the Indus irrigation waters was the subject of bitter dispute between the two countries and is only partially resolved. The Kashmir issue, however, continues as a problem which must be decided before any lasting peace can be anticipated in South Asia.

Pakistan considers that India constitutes a threat to her existence and uses that threat, plus the Kashmir dispute, as a touchstone by which to judge relations with all foreign countries. It has moved through three foreign policy phases having first shown an inclination toward neutrality, then came military alignment with the Western powers, and currently there is a shift toward a more independent policy and better relations with the Communist nations.

The United States has an important interest in Pakistan and has notably contributed to its economic improvement and modernization of its military forces during recent years. At the same time, the United States has experienced a diplomatic failure in its relations with Pakistan.

This thesis concludes that Pakistan has a stable government, a comparatively healthy economy, and an efficient army and air force. It is important to the United States, and of interest to the USSR and Communist China, because of its strategic location. Considerable economic progress has been made through aid provided by the United States, and this assistance should be continued. Additionally, the United States should attempt to assist in unbiased resolution of the Kashmir issue. Pakistani leaders would prefer to remain an ally of the West. Their actions will be governed largely by future United States foreign policy.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan, one of the largest of the new countries which gained independence after World War II, was created to be the homeland of Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.¹ This purpose correctly implies a long history of difficulty, dispute, and bloodshed which must be examined and understood before it is possible to really appreciate the complex and unique nation. It is unique in so many conditions and circumstances that numerous individuals in different parts of the world questioned the wisdom of partitioning British India and predicted Pakistan's early demise.² Lacking a history of national unity and with no common language or uniform culture, the neophyte dominion, which was neither a geographical nor an economic unit, struggled for survival.³ Existence for some eighteen and a half years has served to place these problems in clearer focus but still has not eliminated them.

Nevertheless, this nation, born in chaos⁴ and reared in adversity, has performed its first task of holding the country together and maintaining continuance of the state. Its struggle to find an acceptable place in the family of nations eventually brought it to

¹Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 521.

²Louis Dupree, A Note on Pakistan, p. 1.

³Keith Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, p. 11.

⁴Ian Stephens, Pakistan, p. 182.

a phase of close cooperation with the United States. Then subsequent disillusionment resulted in reexamination of its foreign policy and a continuing search for a national identity. As a nation of the East, it has attempted to orient its political, social, and economic institutions with Western patterns.

Occupying, as it does, a strategic position in Asia, Pakistan's unusual problems may seriously affect the balance of power in the affairs of the southern part of that continent. This has been recognized and appreciated within the United States Government during the last twelve or more years; but, unfortunately, Pakistan is little better known by Americans than by most other people of the world. It has remained in the shadow of India since its independence, achieving international notice infrequently by virtue of some disrupting incident.⁵

This thesis concerns itself with study of the country, devoting special attention to those characteristics of people, geography, economy, and government which may be of value to personnel in the United States Government or its military services in future dealings with Pakistan. Consequently, certain matters which have been, and may still be, of importance to Pakistan are scarcely mentioned due to the limited scope of this paper. For this reason, little notice is taken of Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan.

⁵Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, p. vii.

Difficulties and differences existing in the subcontinent before and during partition still exert strong influences on actions of leaders of both India and Pakistan because those nations still have a history of less than nineteen years. Many leaders of the nations participated in those early differences and are occasionally governed by their memory. Problems of Pakistan have generally exceeded those of India in number and intensity, and India has not attempted to assist in changing this situation. The next decade could determine whether Pakistan is able to take a realistic view of her strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis other nations of the world and, by so doing, ascertain the kind of nation it wants to be--that is, end its search for identity.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

More than four thousand years ago the ancient cities of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa flourished in the Indus Valley of the country now known as Pakistan. The people had a written language, as evidenced by short inscriptions on seal stones, which is still undeciphered. Their domesticated animals included water buffalo, sheep, camels, cattle, and elephants; and there are definite evidences of clothing made from hand woven cotton and woolen cloth. The high order of this culture was comparable to those of Egypt and Mesopotamia during this period.¹

The next group to inhabit the area entered by the passes in the mountains of western and northwestern Pakistan and are known as the Aryans. They were eventually conquered by the great Persian kings, Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, who were followed by Alexander the Great. In about 530 A.D., a confederacy of Hindu princes gained control and maintained Hindu culture at its height for several years.²

The Islamic Era

It was not until the eighth century that an Arab force with its Islam religion penetrated the region and brought portions of

¹Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan Yesterday and Today, pp. 24-25.

²United Kingdom Government Overseas Information Services, "Fact Sheets on the Commonwealth," pp. 1-2.

it under control. The first province of India to succumb to Muslim control was Sind, at the head of the Arabian Sea, but Lahore was eventually established as the center of Muslim culture.³

A succession of invasions from Afghanistan resulted in Muslim rule everywhere except in the extreme south of what is now called the India-Pakistan subcontinent. Wars and invasions continued between rival groups of Muslim conquerors who were alternately generous and cruel, capricious and just. They made certain that the stubborn Hindus were impoverished and enslaved. Despite the harsh oppressions, however, Hindu revolts occurred repeatedly. The sultanate dynasty was weakened by frequent dynastic quarrels resulting from indistinctness of the royal line of succession. The brief but incredibly destructive raid of Timurlane, who swept through the Punjab to take Delhi in 1398, pausing to collect and execute thousands of "infidel" prisoners, is indicative of the unrest and violence prevalent during this era.⁴

The establishment of the Mongul Empire in 1505 denoted a new phase of Muslim rule which had a unifying influence in its early period. The arrangements of Akbar the Great for the administration of this vast domain and for assessment of taxes on the basis of actual land measurements provided basis for the administrative structure which the British employed in India many years later.

³Robert D. Campbell, Pakistan: Emerging Democracy, p. 2.

⁴Wilber, op. cit., pp. 54-56.

Hindu princes were given high command in the army and designated governors of important provinces. There was some sharing in religious and social practices, and both communities often took part in the public portions of the other's festivals.⁵

Aurangzeb, the last great Mongul, reigned from 1657 to 1707, a period which was marked by adherence to strict Islamic orthodoxy. Although his mother and grandmothers were Hindus, he was determined to convert non-Muslims and deprived the recalcitrant Hindus of justice, forcing them into subordinate status. After his death, the Mongul court was noted for magnificence and debauchery; and the power of the empire began to diminish.⁶ The British East India Company then became predominant following the battle of Plassey in 1757, and it maintained that position until the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857. The suppression of this latter revolution swept away the last vestiges of the Mongul Empire and served as a beginning of the gradual obscuration of Muslim modes of government.⁷

British Rule

For many years after the Mutiny the Muslims were treated with suspicion by the British who followed a policy of playing off one group against the other. They employed a conciliatory attitude toward the Hindus and one of retribution, discrimination, and distrust

⁵Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis, p. 12.

⁶Wilber, op. cit., pp. 75-79.

⁷K. Sarawar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, pp. 20-21.

toward the Muslims. At a time when new classes of civil servants and industrial managers were appearing among the Hindus, Muslims, who had been accustomed to privileged positions in the army and administration, were shunted from public life and deprived of employment and status.⁸ The British destroyed their system of education, confiscated their lands and agencies of commerce, and almost wholly excluded them from remunerative or responsible positions. All of this was accomplished to the advantage of the Hindus who were quick to react to the extreme reversal of positions and to improve their knowledge of English by attending the British missionary schools, thereby equipping themselves for advancement in administration of the country.⁹ When that responsibility was passed to them in the ensuing years, the Indian Civil Service established world renowned standards of efficiency and incorruptibility.¹⁰

The Government of India Act of 1858 placed British India under the direct rule of the crown.¹¹ Most of the Indian princes had remained loyal to the British during the Mutiny and were rewarded by treaties or agreements which guaranteed British aid in retaining their holdings. These princely states, in turn, pledged allegiance to the English Crown as Emperor of India. The provinces, which constituted the more populous and important part of the country, had

⁸Hasan, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

⁹Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, pp. 26-27.

¹⁰Norman D. Palmer, "Part Three: India" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 279.

¹¹United Kingdom Government Overseas Information Services, op. cit., p. 2.

governors who operated under the supervision of the Governor-General or Viceroy.¹²

The dividing of India into two kinds of political units insured British control of the subcontinent with a minimum of expense and effort. There were, however, some six hundred of the princely states; and their position in relation to the provinces worsened rapidly. The people were completely dependent upon their ruler who often differed from the majority of his subjects in language, religion, diet, and interests. Vast differences within and between the princely states contributed to an increase of communal strife between Muslims and Hindus.¹³

Nationalism

Communalism is a term used in the subcontinent to refer to a sense of insecurity which any community feels and the attendant action it takes to defend itself and advance its own interests. Its most prevalent use has been with reference to the animosity existing in Hindu-Muslim relationships which has historically been one of the most powerful influences and the most divisive force of the area.¹⁴ Not only their two religions but also their social systems are primarily in opposition to each other.

¹²W. Norman Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan (Rev.), p. 43.

¹³Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, pp. 8-15.

¹⁴Brown, op. cit., p. 130.

Marked contrast between the two cultures demonstrates reasons for the animosity which prevails, but it does not signify that they have little in common. Instead, the two groups speak the same language and belong to the same ethnic stock. They have lived together for many years in varying degrees of rivalry and have each adopted some of the other's customs and ceremonies, but the many cruelties and injustices inflicted during these hundreds of years contribute to strengthening the antagonism beyond the capability of similarities to induce meaningful cooperation.¹⁵

This antagonism was directly reflected in the communalism which increased in India throughout the nineteenth century and may well have contributed to the growth of nationalism near the end of that century. Indian nationalism as an organized movement had its beginning in 1885 with the founding of the Indian National Congress by the British reformer, Allan Octavian Hume.¹⁶ It was not an independence movement in the beginning but was created to provide an impetus to the advancement of the educated new middle class of India. British membership and guidance was substantial; in fact, four of the first twenty presidents of the Congress were British. During its gradual development into a full-scale nationalist movement, the Congress had a sizeable group of Muslim members.¹⁷ It eventually served as a focus of grievances common to the Indian

¹⁵Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁶Wilcox, op. cit., p. 18.

¹⁷Symonds, op. cit., p. 39.

people and became the unifying element behind the later demands for dominion status and then for complete independence. The Congress also came to be more vigorous and more radical with the passage of time, falling under the influence of Hindu revivalism which was both anti-Western and inimical to the Muslims as it assumed religious aspects.¹⁸

The Muslims had conducted a quiet withdrawal from Western developments following the Mutiny and had failed to establish a noteworthy place for themselves under British rule. The growth of Indian nationalism, however, during the twentieth century moved the dissension between Muslims and Hindus from religion and economics into politics. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who was in the British service, visited England in 1869, where he was much impressed by the contrast between life there and in India. He returned to insist that a liberal education in the Western sense could liberate the dormant Muslim spirit and give it the intellectual tools to compete with both the Hindus and the British.¹⁹ Sir Sayyid founded Aligarh University in 1875 and exerted his influence to establish better relations between Muslims and the British.²⁰ Observing that the Muslims in India were outnumbered by the Hindus, three to one, he emphasized that if the English were to leave, the Muslims would be reduced to an almost powerless minority under control of the Hindus. Such observations led in 1906, to the organization of the Muslim

¹⁸Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 424.

¹⁹Symonds, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

²⁰Brown, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

League which was the beginning of modern Muslim politics. Some thirty years later, the League represented the Muslims of India in much the same way that the Congress represented the Hindus.²¹

Independence Movement

The advent of World War II reinvigorated Indian hopes for the independence which had failed to materialize after World War I. Both the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi, and the Muslim League with its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, did agree on the desirability of independence but on little else. By this time the League was convinced that Muslims would be completely dominated by the Congress unless a division of any independent India into Muslim and Hindu majority areas could be effected. At a meeting in Lahore in 1940, the League adopted the goal of a separate Muslim state and pursued this goal thereafter.²²

In May 1946, the British government announced its intention to quit India and subsequently convened a constituent assembly to frame an Indian constitution. The plan provided that India was to be composed initially of three regions which might secede later, if they wished. The agreement with the princely states would be terminated leaving them the alternative of independence or accession to the Indian government. All of this made provision for Pakistan but did not establish it. Meanwhile, brutal Hindu-Muslim violence

²¹Callard, op. cit., pp. 423-424.

²²Brown, op. cit., pp. 142-152.

and communal killing reached a scale throughout most of India which required urgent action to stop the bloody dispute.²³ Accordingly, on February 20, 1947, British Prime Minister Atlee announced that Britain would withdraw from the subcontinent no later than June 1948, and suggested partition of the country, establishing two independent states, as a possible solution.²⁴

When the newly appointed Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, arrived in India, he concluded that conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that more urgent action was necessary. It seemed evident that agreement between Congress and the League was impossible so in an effort to preclude increased violence, and with the indorsement of the leaders of both groups, he announced that the transfer date would be advanced to August 1947; and the two dominions, India and Pakistan, would be established. On the fifteenth day of that month, Pakistan became a dominion in the British Commonwealth.²⁵

²³Wilcox, op. cit., pp. 37-44.

²⁴Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, p. 34.

²⁵Tinker, op. cit., pp. 36-40.

CHAPTER 3

PAKISTAN, THE NEW NATION

Early Difficulties of Partition

The Indian Independence Act, which was passed by the British Parliament on July 18, 1947, provided for the establishment of two independent dominions from the former British territory of India. The Indian National Congress had reluctantly agreed to this division, known as partition, with the provision that non-Muslim majority areas should not be included in Pakistan against their will. Those provinces or districts which voted to join Pakistan included the Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan, the western districts of the Punjab, the eastern district of Bengal, and the district of Sylhet in Assam.¹ These last two constituted East Pakistan which was separated from the remainder of the nation by approximately a thousand miles.

The most effective force in producing disunity on the sub-continent had been religion, and the majority religious composition of the population was the determining factor in the fixing of national boundaries. Lord Mountbatten appointed boundary commissions to distinguish the boundaries, with Sir Cyril Radcliffe, one of England's

¹Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, pp. 70-71.

most respected jurists, as chairman and with members representing India and Pakistan. He also appointed a Joint Defense Council consisting of himself, the Defense Ministers of both India and Pakistan, and the British supreme military commander, to perform the task of dividing the military forces and stores. Partition Councils, similarly organized, were also established by Mountbatten to divide the assets and liabilities of the Indian Empire.²

The Independence Act terminated agreements between Britain and the princely states and provided them freedom to decide whether to maintain independent status or accede either to India or Pakistan. The Frontier chiefs and the princes of Bahawalpur and the Sind Talpurs grudgingly acceded to Pakistan while most of the remainder just as slowly joined India. Three states, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir delayed further, hoping to be able to maintain independence.³

Celebrations of independence in the two nations unfortunately generated tensions resulting in violence to an extreme unanticipated by Indian, Pakistani, or British officials. As millions of Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus migrated to join their fellow religionists, they were attacked and murdered, with Sikhs and Hindus opposing Muslims. Peaceful villages in the Punjab suddenly became divided into two hostile groups with each attempting to exterminate the other. Estimates of the dead have been as high as a million, but it would be most difficult

²Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, pp. 39-40.

³High Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis, p. 39.

to provide a figure which could be reasonably supported. Approximately 12,000,000 migrants moved between the two countries during this period producing the largest population exchange ever experienced.⁴

Unexpected announcement of the advance of the date of partition from June 1948 to August 1947 allowed slightly less than two months and a half to plan and accomplish this political and administrative operation. After the mass migration Pakistan was left with few merchants, bankers, traders, teachers, doctors, and technical personnel. Most of the industrial complex was situated in areas retained by India. There was no established central administration; and Bengal and the Punjab, which had been the two leading provinces of the area, were divided by the partition and suffered greatly as a result. There was no legislature but only a political party, the Muslim League, with Mohammed Ali Jinnah as its leader. He acted as head of the legislature, the party, and the administration. Jinnah was called by the title Quaid-i-Azam, which means great leader; and he dominated all aspects of the life of Pakistan.⁵ He held the offices of governor-general and president of the constituent assembly.⁶

The severely limited number of well-trained Pakistani civil servants were rapidly promoted and used to great advantage, but heavy reliance was necessarily placed on the British personnel who remained

⁴W. Norman Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, pp. 161-162.

⁵Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, pp. 431-434.

⁶Tinker, op. cit., p. 71.

to assist in Pakistan for several years.⁷ Many people in India and the western world predicted that this government, which was being improvised at Karachi, could not endure.⁸

The arrival of some six million refugees from India, most of whom brought only a small bundle of personal possessions, added greatly to the difficulties. They moved by the thousands toward towns where temporary refugee camps had been established, and there they stayed for many years in squalid huts devoid of adequate water and sanitation.⁹

The Princely States

As has already been indicated by mention of communal violence and the refugee problem, both of which were experienced to a similar degree in India as well, relations between the two countries were strained from the beginning. These were further complicated by more-lasting disputes concerning the three princely states that had delayed accession to either country. Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir had failed to follow the advice of Lord Mountbatten that the princely states should accede to one of the dominions, giving due consideration to geographical compulsion and the wishes of the people.¹⁰

⁷Symonds, op. cit., p. 91.

⁸Keith Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, p. 14.

⁹Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan; The Consolidation of a Nation, pp. 53-56.

¹⁰Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 56-60.

Junagadh was a small coastal state located more than two hundred miles from the nearest Pakistan territory and connected by all land routes with India. After much delay and concurrent with the receipt of queries from India regarding his intent, the Muslim ruler of Junagadh signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan on September 15, 1947. This action was contrary to the advice of Mountbatten on both counts since, in addition to being physically separated from Pakistan, the population of the state was predominantly Hindu. Pakistan accepted this accession, but India demanded a plebiscite and eventually dispatched military forces to the border of Junagadh. The ruler then fled to Pakistan, and the prime minister invited the Indian troops to enter the state. The result of a subsequent plebiscite was an overwhelming majority in favor of accession to India, so it was accomplished.¹¹ Pakistan brought the matter before the United Nations Security Council on January 15, 1948, but no action was taken.¹²

The state of Hyderabad was the second largest of the prepartition Indian states, consisting of approximately 82,313 square miles and with a population nearing 16.5 million. It, too, had a predominantly Hindu population, a Muslim ruling dynasty, and was surrounded by India. The ruler of Hyderabad endeavored to remain independent; but India exerted strong pressure and prepared for invasion of the state, which was executed on September 18, 1948.

¹¹Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 304.

¹²Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

Factors contributing to this action included communal violence in Hyderabad, some Communist activity, and a disagreement regarding the loan of about \$62,000,000, made by the state to Pakistan. It seems clear that India found it necessary to annex Hyderabad; but large numbers of Muslims were slaughtered during the military action; and the reaction in Pakistan, as well as some other parts of the world, was unfavorable. The ruler of the state then withdrew his complaint against India, which was pending in the Security Council.¹³

Although there was much bitterness in Pakistan concerning the affairs of Junagadh and Hyderabad, they might have been dismissed in a relatively short time except for the matter of Kashmir.¹⁴ This princely state was officially known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir. At the time of partition it was estimated that 77 percent of its total population was Muslim, and it was contiguous with Pakistan. Here, then, was a situation which was the reverse of Junagadh and Hyderabad and which reached its critical stage between the time of crisis of those two states. The Hindu Maharajah transmitted identical standstill agreements to both Pakistan and India indicating that he wished to normalize relations with both countries. This agreement was accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India.¹⁵ Soon after partition, revolts broke out against the Maharajah's Hindu troops in some of the heavily Muslim sections of the state. In October 1947, tribal

¹³Brown, op. cit., pp. 175-179.

¹⁴Wilber, op. cit., p. 305.

¹⁵Wilcox, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

warriors from the Northwest Frontier Province of West Pakistan, perhaps assisted by officials of that province, invaded the Kashmir Valley and attempted to seize control of the state. When the seriousness of the threat was clearly established, the Maharajah sent his accession to India and urgently requested military assistance. Indian troops were flown to Kashmir; and Mountbatten, in his capacity as Governor-General of India, approved the annexation with the promise that the question would subsequently be settled by reference to the people.¹⁶

Both India and Pakistan brought the Kashmir dispute before the United Nations where the Security Council effected the establishment of a cease-fire line in January 1949. Although both countries accepted the principle of submitting the question to a plebiscite, as proposed by the Security Council, no agreement could be reached on the demilitarization of the area as part of the terms of the referendum.¹⁷ The Kashmir issue has continued to represent the largest dispute between India and Pakistan and so will be discussed further in a subsequent chapter.

Division of Assets and Military Stores

One of the most important of the many problems to be solved by India and Pakistan, as they assumed independence, was division of the assets and liabilities of British India. The Partition Council

¹⁶Wilber, op. cit., pp. 305-307.

¹⁷K. Sarawar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, pp. 118-164.

which was to accomplish this division, consisted of two representatives of each of the countries and was presided over by Mountbatten. The recommendations of ten expert committees, which also consisted of equal representation, were submitted to the council through a steering committee composed of senior civil servants. A determination was made that Pakistan would receive 17.5 percent of the joint assets with cash credits to be substituted when items could not be divided. Under this arrangement India retained most museums, laboratories, research stations, and unusual institutions while Pakistan received payment and the right to use them for the following five years.¹⁸

There was disagreement, however, concerning a cash balance of approximately \$170,000,000 which was in the possession of India. As a result of the Kashmir issue certain Indian officials opposed division of this money with Pakistan on the basis that it would be used in the conflict against them. After a prolonged controversy payment was eventually arranged, perhaps as a result of Gandhi's fast for better treatment of Muslims in India in January 1948.¹⁹ It was agreed that railways and communications facilities should be modified only as dictated by the requirements of partition.²⁰

¹⁸Symonds, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

¹⁹Brown, op. cit., p. 166.

²⁰Wayne A. Wilcox, "The Economic Consequences of Partition: India and Pakistan," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1964, p. 190.

A Joint Defense Council, with Mountbatten as neutral chairman and Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck as executive agent, was assigned the mission of supervising the division of the armed forces and military stores by April 1, 1948.²¹ Agreement was reached that the 420,000 man Indian army should be kept intact temporarily and under British supervision to provide some security from the prevalent violence.²² It was also agreed that India would receive two-thirds of the forces and equipment and Pakistan one-third.²³ Nine of the twelve engineer store depots, however, and all of the seventeen ordnance factories were located in Indian territory; and the reluctance of Indian officials to transfer factories, ammunition, and equipment at this time can be appreciated. Unfortunately, the delay and contention resulted in decision by the British government to close Mountbatten's headquarters by November 30, 1947, and before the division could have been reasonably completed.²⁴ Pakistan recognized that this decision seriously reduced her chances of receiving a fair share of the stores and complained bitterly, but also unsuccessfully.²⁵

Evacuee Property

Mention has been made of the millions of migrants who moved between the two countries after partition, seeking to relocate with

²¹Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

²²Wilcox, "The Economic Consequence of Partition: India and Pakistan," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1964, p. 190.

²³Wilber, op. cit., p. 215.

²⁴Fazal Muqueem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, pp. 26-36.

²⁵Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, pp. 84-85.

those of similar religious beliefs, and immediate problems occasioned by the move. There were, however, associated matters of lesser urgency which continued to plague the relations of the two nations for many years after partition. These refugees left behind almost all of their possessions, including land, buildings, and commercial and industrial property. It was not altogether unusual for a whole village or section of town to be abandoned and left defenseless.²⁶ Involved were hundreds of thousands of buildings and millions of acres of land.

Inasmuch as the non-Muslim refugees had generally occupied relatively prominent positions in their trade or profession while Muslims had to be relegated to more humble stations during British rule, Hindu and Sikh migrants were, as groups, much richer. It follows then, that the value of property left by Hindus in Pakistan greatly exceeded that left by Muslims in India. This has been submitted as one explanation for the seeming uncooperative attitude of Pakistan during and following some of the six Inter-Dominion Conferences convened to consider this controversial and delicate issue. Several agreements toward equitable determination and settlement of claims have been made, broken, and followed by both governments making still harsher accusations of nonimplementation and bad faith against the other.²⁷ Both insured that the property in question was not allowed

²⁶Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, p. 17.

²⁷Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 189-207.

to remain idle pending settlement of legal ownership, and some distribution was made among incoming refugees.²⁸ This problem has embittered Indo-Pakistan relations significantly, however.

Looking backward over the history of the hectic and violent months marking the genesis of the nation of Pakistan, chaos and turmoil attending its birth provide a background for the fear and distrust which characterized this period. Independence for the state was both unplanned and unanticipated. From the June 3, 1947, announcement that India would be partitioned until the transfer of power, allowed only seventy-two days to create the dominion, without a framework on which to build, and in an environment where disciplinary procedures had almost ceased to exist.²⁹

²⁸Robert D. Campbell, Pakistan: Emerging Democracy, p. 101.

²⁹Wilcox, "The Economic Consequence of Partition: India and Pakistan," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1964, p. 190.

CHAPTER 4

THE APPRAISAL

Numerous individuals of varied nationalities and stature have expressed the opinion that Pakistan should never have become a nation but that it "like most post-World War II nations, exists as a legacy of Western imperialism and internal fractionization."¹ The charges have also been made that its creation disregarded all economic, linguistic and ethnic elements, and that almost all of those who have watched the evolution of Pakistan considered it as an impractical experiment.²

Geography

The external relations and policies of any country are largely governed by her geographical situation. Pakistan consists of two distinct zones, East and West Pakistan, now constituting its two provinces and separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory. While West Pakistan borders on the Middle East, East Pakistan lies just outside Southeast Asia. The sea route between the two zones passes around the Indian Peninsula for a distance of nearly 3,000 miles, along a coastline that is unprotected and poorly adapted to

¹Louis Dupree, A Note on Pakistan, p. 1.

²US Dept of Defense, The Military Assistance Institute, Pakistan: Country Study, p. v. (referred to hereafter as "Country Study").

important maritime activity. East Pakistan and West Pakistan have about 2,000 miles of common frontier with India.³ The two provinces differ to such extent that they need to be described separately to be understood.

West Pakistan has an area of approximately 310,500 square miles and is roughly 300 miles wide and 1,000 miles from north to south. Its terrain varies from the towering peaks of the Himalayas to the west and north of the long Indus River to the nearly level sandy plains of the Thar Desert east of the river.⁴ The Indus, with its tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej, provides the source of an irrigation system for the flat stoneless alluvial lowland.⁵ These rivers depend more on the melting of Himalayan snow than on the meager rainfall of the area. The sea coast along the Arabian Sea on the south is also arid and largely devoid of vegetation.⁶

East Pakistan, with an area of approximately 55,000 square miles, is situated at the head of the Bay of Bengal, and consists almost entirely of an alluvial plain formed by the lower reaches of Brahmaputra River system. The Chittagong Hills in the east rise up to 2,000-3,000 feet, but most of this province is flat, wet, and weeded. The area is dominated by an intricate river system, dense population, lush tropical vegetation, and heavy rainfall.⁷

³K. Sarwar Hasan, The Strategic Interests of Pakistan, p. 1.

⁴Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan Yesterday and Today, pp. 4-5.

⁵Country Study, p. 2.

⁶United Kingdom Government Overseas Information Services, "Fact Sheets on the Commonwealth," p. 1.

⁷Dupree, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

Strategic Location

The most northern portion of West Pakistan borders on the narrow strip of Afghanistan, known as the Wakhan Corridor, which separates Pakistan from the USSR. Its width in this mountainous region varies from fifteen to fifty miles.⁸ West Pakistan controls the Khojak and Khyber passes through the mountains which must be negotiated before any invader from the north can penetrate the subcontinent. From its situation at the head of the Arabian Sea, West Pakistan also dominates the Gulf of Oman which is the sea outlet from the Persian Gulf and a route used for the shipping of Middle East oil.⁹

Three passes, Kilki, Mintaka, and Karakoram, provide access westward through the rugged Karakoram Mountain Range from the Chinese province of Sinkiang into the disputed Jammu and Kashmir area and then converge on Rawalpindi, Pakistan. An alternate route of greater distance avoids Rawalpindi by turning south through the Banihal Pass which leads to the city of Jammu at the border of West Pakistan.¹⁰ The crossing of the McMahon Line and occupation of the Ladakh area of Jammu and Kashmir during the summer and autumn of 1959 by Chinese forces invites attention to possibilities of threats from this direction.¹¹

⁸O. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography, p. 382.

⁹Country Study, p. 2.

¹⁰Maharaj K. Chopra, "Land Communications Through Asia's Highest Mountains," Military Review, Nov. 1965, pp. 3-6.

¹¹Woodford A. Heflin, "India, Pakistan, and Ceylon," in Strategic Briefs, US Air University, Air Command and Staff College Correspondence Course 3A, p. 140.

The port city of Karachi on the Arabian Sea provides a prize which could be an objective of either a Russian or Chinese aggressor force which had successfully negotiated one or more of the mountain passes. It might possibly be used to good advantage in an effort to disrupt air communications between West and East and to interfere with shipping of western nations in the Indian Ocean.¹² This threat could be even more serious if the aggressor were able to maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan. A Pakistan friendly with the West would make the development of a threat of this nature less likely.

The vulnerability of Pakistan to enemy attack from several directions is ominously evident to even the casual observer. Invading forces have historically demonstrated their ability to overcome defenses established in the mountain passes of the northwest to such extent that they have been termed the classic route into India. British apprehension of a possible Russian advance through Afghanistan and then through these passes, together with their view that only a united India could be defended, caused them to seize Sind and the Punjab before the middle of the nineteenth century. East Pakistan is without natural defenses and so remote from the more dynamic western province that it is at the mercy of India and subject to attack from Burma.¹³

¹²Hasan, op. cit., p. 2.

¹³W. Norman Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, pp. 148-150.

The People

According to the 1961 census, Pakistan's population was 93,831,000, making it the seventh most populous country of the world. Since its population is increasing at the high rate of approximately 2.16 percent a year, the total might now exceed 100,000,000.¹⁴

The average population density for all of Pakistan was 256 persons per square mile, based on an average of 138 persons per square mile in West Pakistan and 922 persons per square mile in East Pakistan. A preponderance of males was recorded in the census with that sex accounting for 52.6 percent and 47.4 percent being listed as females.¹⁵

Muslims constituted 88.1 percent of the total population, Caste Hindus 4.9 percent, Scheduled Cast ("untouchables") 5.8 percent, Christians 0.8 percent, Buddhists 0.4 percent, and others 0.05 percent. Most of the Hindus live in East Pakistan.¹⁶ They are a sensitive people, proud of their contribution to Indian literature, art, and politics and bitterly resentful of their loss of influence.¹⁷

Some thirty-two distinct languages are spoken plus a number of dialects, but no single language is commonly spoken or understood.

¹⁴Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, pp. 46-47.

¹⁵Country Study, p. 11.

¹⁶Dupree, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁷Country Study, p. 14.

Urdu and Bengali have been designated as national languages while English is the language of the government used for official purposes. Bengali is spoken by almost everyone in East Pakistan but is not used in West Pakistan.¹⁸ Those reported as literate in 1961 totaled 14,335,009, representing 19.2 percent of all aged 5 and over and 15.9 percent of the total population.¹⁹

The Government

After announcement that the subcontinent would be partitioned, the All-India Constituent Assembly was divided by act of the British Parliament into two parts with one empowered to draft a constitution for India and the other to draft one for Pakistan. Numerous early difficulties experienced by Pakistan, together with deterioration of its Indian relations, precluded substantial progress toward adoption of a constitution.²⁰

The unfortunate death in 1948 of the governor-general, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and then the assassination in 1951 of the prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, left no nationally recognized leader. The country's major problems were still unsolved, and internal crises became more prevalent as East Pakistan registered discontent with its share of economic programs and West Pakistan experienced tensions between its different districts. During all

¹⁸Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, pp. 71-73.

¹⁹S. H. Steinberg, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook, 1965-66, p. 446.

²⁰Raye R. Platt, ed., Pakistan, A Compendium, pp. 21-23.

of this time, and until 1956, Pakistan operated under a provisional constitution which was an adaptation of the Government of India Act of 1935. With the adoption of a constitution on March 23, 1956, it ceased to be a dominion and became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, still a member of the Commonwealth.²¹

Political instability after the assassination of Ali Khan brought numerous partisan realignments and several changes in the national government as well as in the governments of both provinces. Dupree described the period of 1954 to 1958 as follows:

Civil disturbances broke out; the constituent assembly endlessly debated trivialities; regionalism supplanted nationalism; national unity became a myth; and corrupt practice became an accepted way of life.²²

When parliamentary government seemed on the verge of collapse, President Iskandar Mirza declared on October 7, 1958, imposition of martial law, abrogation of the constitution, dissolution of provincial and national legislatures, and named General Muhammad Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator. On October 24, General Ayub was appointed prime minister and three days later assumed the presidency with the forced resignation of Mirza. He was elected president on February 14, 1960.²³

It was not until 1960 that a commission was appointed to draft a new constitution. This commission's report was submitted in March

²¹Keith Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, pp. 19-32.

²²Dupree, op. cit., p. 13.

²³Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 218.

1961, however; and the constitution was enacted on March 1, 1962. It embodies elements of the first constitution but also clearly follows the American presidential system of government and uses, with very little change, the administrative and judicial structure by which the British governed the area in the nineteenth century.²⁴ This constitution does not define the state as an "Islamic republic" but it does provide that no law may be repugnant to Islam.²⁵ Pakistan is pledged by its constitution to the creation of a welfare state.²⁶

The government is federal and presidential in form. The National Assembly consists of 156 members, 78 from each province, including three seats from each province reserved for women. Each wing of the country has a Provincial Assembly of 155 members, including five reserved seats for women. The President, who is also Supreme Commander of the military forces, has wide executive powers. He selects the cabinet, the members of which may also be members of the Assembly; and he appoints the governors of the two provinces.²⁷

The Economy

Pakistan is a member of that group of nations termed undeveloped or emerging nations. Before partition of the subcontinent, the two

²⁴Ibid., pp. 234-235.

²⁵Robert D. Campbell, Pakistan: Emerging Democracy, pp. 37-39.

²⁶Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 514.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 450-461.

areas which are now the two provinces of Pakistan, were its most underdeveloped districts. An absence of industry at that time was noted in the previous chapter, and the limited amount of trade and banking which was conducted was controlled by Hindus and Sikhs who migrated to India at the time of partition.²⁸ Muslim refugees who replaced them could contribute little which was vital to the economy, while departees represented some fundamentals of the economic system.²⁹

As he presented the first budget in 1948, the nation's finance minister stated that it had been necessary from the beginning "to face unprecedented difficulties and difficulties which would have overwhelmed many an old and well-established government, and shattered the economy of any well-organized country."³⁰ It is not entirely clear how collapse was avoided, but resiliency accompanying unorganization plus determination and some dedication of leaders and population may have been contributing factors. The Korean War also provided markets for export crops of Pakistan and brought some measure of prosperity.³¹

Pakistan is essentially an agricultural country with exports of agricultural products and of commodities derived from agricultural products accounting for approximately 80 percent of total exports.

²⁸Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 352.

²⁹Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis, p. 69.

³⁰Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 352.

³¹Platt, op. cit., p. 23.

About 85 percent of the population live in rural areas.³² The most important agricultural products are foodgrains for domestic consumption which occupy more than 84 percent of the total acreage cultivated.³³

Because of climatic and terrain differences, it is not surprising that East Pakistan and West Pakistan differ agriculturally as well. East Pakistan's principal crop is rice, the crop to which 46 percent of the cultivated land of the entire nation is planted. Other important crops of the eastern province are jute, tea, linseed, sesame, rape and mustard, tobacco, and sugar cane. Agriculture in this province enjoys a wealth of natural moisture.³⁴

Wheat is the staple food of West Pakistan and also its chief crop. Millet, barley, chick-peas, grain sorghum, corn, rape and mustard, sugar cane, tobacco, cotton, wool, and dairy products are produced in this wing of the country. The land, except for the area near the mountains, depends on one of the world's largest irrigating systems supplied with water from the Indus River, its tributaries, and numerous wells.³⁵

Widespread encroachment of water-logging, salinity, and inefficient use of water result from lack of knowledge of land/water

³²US Dept of State, Agency for International Development, Long-Range Assistance Strategy for Pakistan, FY 1967 (U), p. SD/II/HA-1. SECRET (referred to hereafter as LAS).

³³US Dept of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of Pakistan," Overseas Business Reports, OBR 63-134, p. 6. (referred to hereafter as OBR 63-134).

³⁴Ibid., pp. 5-6.

³⁵Ibid.

relationships. Additionally, a majority of the farmers in East and West Pakistan rely on agricultural methods which were in use some two thousand years ago. Less than ten percent have used some chemical fertilizers, and even fewer have been introduced to modern agricultural theories, practices, or procedures.³⁶

Mineral production is quite limited and almost entirely confined to West Pakistan. Some minerals which have been exploited on a commercial scale include natural gas, petroleum, coal, chromite, limestone, gypsum, celestite, fire clays, rock salt, and silica sand.³⁷ Discovery of relatively large natural gas fields promises much toward solution of Pakistan's serious fuel and electrical problems. Petroleum explorations have been unsuccessfully conducted during the past several years by both American and Soviet companies.³⁸

The government has played a pre-eminent role in efforts to develop the country's economy and has embarked on a series of development plans. The First Five-Year Plan, which ended in 1960, was modestly financed and overly optimistic about results.³⁹ It failed to achieve its goals primarily because the population increase far outstripped original estimates.⁴⁰ That experience was helpful, however, in formulating the Second Five-Year Plan covering the

³⁶LAS, pp. LAS-67-68.

³⁷Country Study, p. 99.

³⁸Dupree, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁹Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, pp. 353-354.

⁴⁰Dupree, op. cit., p. 30.

period 1960-65, which had as its principal goals a 24 percent increase in national income and a 12 percent increase in per capita income.⁴¹ That period ended with a Gross National Product growth approximating 29 percent which was about 13 percent increase on a per capita basis.⁴²

These figures represent a remarkable rise in industrial development, the portion of the economy which received the greatest emphasis. Most rapid increases were experienced in large scale manufacturing, mining, construction, and public utilities. In spite of its industrial growth, Pakistan remains primarily an agricultural country. Agriculture still accounts for almost half of the national output so its growth rate is of special interest. During the period of the Second Plan, agricultural production increased at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, almost two and one-half times greater than the rate achieved during the First Plan.⁴³

The United States has provided the largest amount of aid to Pakistan's economic development. Its share for the first four years of the Second Five-Year Plan was \$872,000,000, or nearly 55 percent of the total provided by friendly countries. Most of this was in the form of grants or loans on easy payment terms. The United States has also contributed to the Indus River Basic Development Fund and has sold Pakistan nearly \$707,000,000 worth of surplus agricultural commodities.⁴⁴

⁴¹OBR 63-134, p. 22.

⁴²LAS, p. LAS-3.

⁴³Ibid., p. LAS-3-LAS-4.

⁴⁴Country Study, p. 127.

Pakistan has been an important trading partner of the United States during the 1960's even though there was a noticeable decline in that trade in 1964. Nevertheless, her imports from the United States in 1964 totaled \$415,000,000, which represented 41.6 percent of her total. Pakistan has been the first ranking buyer of United States steel. We have been her principal supplier of machinery, transport equipment, and pharmaceuticals.⁴⁵

As it became clear that targets for the Second Plan were likely to be reached, the outlined overall goal of the Third Five-Year Plan was revised upward from 30 to 37 percent increase in national income.⁴⁶ Another objective of the Third Plan is to reduce the disparity in standard of living between the more sophisticated and industrial West Pakistan and the predominantly agricultural East Wing.⁴⁷ Recent difficulties with India and reluctance of the United States to provide anticipated aid, however, have resulted in announced reduction in government outlays projected for economic development in the current fiscal year.⁴⁸

One of the most serious difficulties impeding development is the critical long-range problem of population growth which, if

⁴⁵US Dept of Commerce, "Market Factors in Pakistan," Overseas Business Reports, OBR 65-24, pp. 1-8. (referred to hereafter as OBR 65-24).

⁴⁶OBR 65-24, p. 4.

⁴⁷F. J. E. Tearle, "Industrial Development in Pakistan," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. LII, Jul/Oct. 1965.

⁴⁸Jacques Nevard, "Pakistan Trims Its Economic Development Plans," New York Times, 1 Nov. 1965, p. 9.

unchecked, may cause all efforts to improve the standard of living to fail.⁴⁹ There is also a definite shortage of managerial skill and experience which limits capability to organize and administer complicated enterprises.⁵⁰ Finally, if defense expenditures go up and foreign aid goes down, the result could be disastrous within the next decade.⁵¹

The Military Forces

Division of the British-Indian military establishment at the time of partition in 1947 provided Pakistan with a large and capable nucleus for its armed forces. Numerous British officers, who continued to serve with their units until 1952, provided assistance during the transition period and advice during reconstruction and reorganization. The last British Army Commander-in-Chief turned over command to General Mohammed Ayub Khan in 1951.⁵²

The largest of the three services was the Army which consisted of six divisions by the beginning of 1948.⁵³ Its current strength approximates 230,000 men, organized on a triangular basis into eight divisions and equipped with M-47 tanks of United States manufacture. Additionally, there is a lightly armed militia, whose strength is

⁴⁹Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 52.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 378-379.

⁵¹Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan: The Development Miracle, p. 12.

⁵²Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, pp. 95-97.

⁵³Fazal Muqem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, p. 47.

roughly 250,000, plus some 30,000 Azad Kashmir troops.⁵⁴ The army is an entirely volunteer force with morale and discipline which are generally considered excellent.⁵⁵

The Pakistan navy has a light cruiser, five destroyers, two frigates, a submarine, a surveying vessel, eight coastal minesweepers, four seaward defense motor launches, two oilers, a water carrier, and four tugs. Its personnel strength is approximately 759 officers and 7,500 men.⁵⁶ Many of these have been trained in the United States, and almost every vessel of the small navy has been modernized or replaced in recent years.⁵⁷ Even so, the small size of the Pakistan navy results in it being the country's weakest defense unit.⁵⁸

The air force includes two squadrons of B-57B (Canberra) bombers, two wings of F-104 Starfighter and F-86 Sabre fighters, RT-33A jet reconnaissance aircraft, four C-130B Hercules turboprop transports and seven Bristol Freighter transports. There are also Albatross amphibians and H-19 helicopters for use in maritime reconnaissance and search and rescue duties.⁵⁹ Its total personnel strength is from 17,000 to 25,000.⁶⁰ Pilots are reputed to display a high degree of

⁵⁴Institute for Strategic Studies, London, The Military Balance, 1964-65, p. 26. (referred to hereafter as The Military Balance).

⁵⁵Country Study, p. 146.

⁵⁶Steinberg, op. cit., p. 447.

⁵⁷Country Study, p. 149.

⁵⁸Richard V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation, p. 124.

⁵⁹Steinberg, op. cit., p. 447.

⁶⁰The Military Balance, p. 26.

skill and initiative and to possess capability to give a good account of themselves.⁶¹

President Ayub Khan, a graduate of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, England, is the titular commander of the defense establishment. The officers are trained in the British military system, and the traditions of their units derive from years of experience under British commanders.⁶² Military personnel of Pakistan remained scrupulously clear of all involvement in politics until 1958 when the government turned to the army for assistance to correct some of the national ills discussed earlier in this chapter. In general, the senior officers are true professional soldiers in appearance and mental attitude, and their principal concern with national politics has been to insure that any political corruption did not undermine the integrity of the forces.⁶³ The United States has spent over a billion dollars on military aid to Pakistan.⁶⁴

⁶¹Country Study, p. 154.

⁶²Weekes, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

⁶³Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, pp. 472-473.

⁶⁴Dupree, op. cit., p. 35.

CHAPTER 5

RELATIONS WITH INDIA

Some familiarity with the historical background of the sub-continent, discussed in an earlier chapter, is essential for thorough appreciation of Pakistan-Indian relations. Competition and conflict between Hindu and Muslim, which extended over many centuries, had an effect which could neither be dispelled nor neutralized through acknowledgement that economies of the two regions involved were interdependent and that the terrain dictated that their security against military attack could be better assured through unity.¹

Even before partition, the Hindus clearly demonstrated dislike of customs and behavior of the Muslims and feared rise to power of this group under whom they had experienced centuries of persecution. Muslims similarly distrusted the Hindus and recognized that their position as a minority in a state controlled by the Hindu majority was an ominous one. Jinnah maintained that their differences were not merely those of two different religions but, instead, those of two different civilizations which were illogically living together under a single government.²

¹K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, p. 34.

²W. Norman Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, p. 130.

Views of the Indian National Congress strongly opposed the two-nation theory and the two-civilization concept, but this opposition was, by circumstance, subordinated to efforts to achieve independence and dominion status. Numerous statements by influential members of the Congress party are available for examination, which make abundantly clear their insistence that India had been fashioned by nature in the geographical form she displayed, and no human agency could alter her shape or destiny.³

As noted earlier, however, the outbreak of bloody communal riots during independence negotiations forced the British to conclude that partition was the only solution⁴ and induced the Congress to agree. Continuation of rioting resulted in conditions providing memories which lingered and poisoned subsequent relations between the new dominions.⁵

Even though the two dominions, India and Pakistan, had been established, the argument persisted in the minds of the leaders of both countries as to whether there should be one or two nations in the subcontinent.⁶ Pakistan claimed in a complaint to the Security Council of the United Nations in 1948, that India had never wholeheartedly accepted partition and had continually made persistent efforts to undo it. The complaint also stated that the object of those in power in India was to paralyze Pakistan at its beginning.⁷

³Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp. 6-7.

⁴"A Legacy of Violent Hatreds and Carnage," Life, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 42.

⁵Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 26.

⁶Callard, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷Hasan, op. cit., p. 37.

It seems clear that while trying to solve her earliest difficulties as a new nation, Pakistan had considered herself playing a role as prey for a hostile India. At the same time, she wanted to vindicate the fight for the two-nation concept by gaining admission from India that Pakistan was inevitable, natural, and right. A principal aim of her foreign policy has been to gain equal status with India in subcontinent affairs.⁸

This concern about relative status with India appears also to have dominated defense and economic policy and even to have affected much of the internal political action. India, in the role of "foreign enemy", has provided a powerful stimulus to national unity. Pakistan narrowly escaped subjection to the Hindu-majority regime, and fear of her numerically-stronger and threateningly-positioned neighbor is a significant factor which can influence almost any decision.⁹ Any other foreign policy issue is secondary to the primary objective of strengthening Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India.¹⁰

With the benefit of this background information concerning the attitude of both countries, the discussion of problems in chapter 2 becomes even more meaningful. All of them influenced, in varying degrees, relations of the two countries during subsequent years; but

⁸Callard, op. cit., p. 14.

⁹Ian Stephens, Pakistan, pp. 213-215.

¹⁰Keith Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, pp. 15-18.

new difficulties also developed. One of the first of these and ranking in importance next to Kashmir, was the Indus water issue.

Distribution of Water

Before partition the Punjab contained one of the largest and most complex irrigation systems in the world, using water from the Indus River and its five tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers. When boundaries of India and Pakistan were established in 1947, most of the irrigated land of the Punjab became part of Pakistan while the upper basins of three of the rivers were in India. The headwaters of the other three were in Jammu and Kashmir, so accession of this state provided India with control of almost all of the water for the irrigation system.¹¹

On April 1, 1948, during the sowing season, the East Punjab government (India) shut off the supply of water to major canals leading into Pakistan, placing that country in a critical position. Pakistan initiated discussions, claiming rights of her citizens as established users of the water and arguing that an upper riparian cannot deny water to a lower riparian. India restored the water supply on May 4, 1948, but insisted that she had exclusive rights to the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers. Pakistan suggested in 1950 that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice,

¹¹Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, pp. 160-162.

but Pandit Nehru disagreed on the basis that such action would represent public acknowledgment of their continued dependence on other nations and inability to act as independent nations.¹²

David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was invited by both countries in 1950 to make a study of irrigation in the Indus Basin. He concluded that the Indus system discharged enough water into the sea during summer floods to supply all practical needs of both countries and outlined a plan for co-operative storage of the wasted flow. Lilienthal published an article which suggested that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development might organize a program for joint development of resources of all the rivers. He emphasized that Pakistan should be guaranteed adequate use of irrigation water pending a final solution of the problem.¹³

The president of the International Bank, Eugene Black, consulted with officials of Pakistan and India, and negotiations were begun. These negotiations continued until September 19, 1960, when the Indus Water Treaty was signed by the two countries.¹⁴ It provided that India should use the three eastern rivers, Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi for irrigation purposes and Pakistan should use the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. A series of link canals was to be constructed to make the water of these rivers available to appropriate nationalities.¹⁵

¹²Hasan, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

¹³Raye R. Platt, ed. Pakistan: A Compendium, p. 219.

¹⁴Wilber, op. cit., p. 311.

¹⁵Stephens, op. cit., p. 227.

An international consortium, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, agreed to finance the construction program at an estimated cost of \$1,070,000,000.¹⁶ Although this solution has reduced tension in the subcontinent, similar problems regarding use of the Ganges waters in East Pakistan remain as sources of friction.¹⁷

Kashmir

All of the differences and difficulties which have exacerbated the animosities between India and Pakistan must be relegated to secondary positions in comparison with the status of Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike the condition of the two nations' other disputes, there has been no real trend toward either settlement or inclusion with the indistinguishable group of chronic complications of the subcontinent. Eighteen years of effort and negotiation have failed to resolve or significantly reduce the dispute over this state. The quarrel proved to be so destructive in Indo-Pakistani affairs that it has been referred to as the "root of all evil."¹⁸

The importance which this issue has attained seems to warrant a detailed reexamination of certain related events of late 1947 and 1948 before consideration of later developments. During the initial

¹⁶Wilber, op. cit., p. 311.

¹⁷Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 520.

¹⁸Stephens, op. cit., p. 196.

period of unrest in Kashmir, Muslims living in its districts near the Pakistan border established an Azad (Free) Kashmir government and organized an army composed of ex-servicemen and Muslim refugees. As Indian troops approached the borders of Pakistan, forcing the disorganized tribesmen and Pakistani volunteers to withdraw, the Pakistan government became alarmed and positioned troops in strategic locations on its border. By May 1948, some of these troops were moved into Azad Kashmir, where they actively opposed the Indian army, to prevent the whole of Kashmir from falling into Indian possession.¹⁹

During this unsettled period, the government of Jammu and Kashmir was controlled by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah who had been sworn in as Head of the Emergency Administration on October 31, 1947, at the request of the maharajah. Thereafter, the maharajah ceased to be of any real consequence in political affairs. Sheikh Abdullah, however, is noteworthy because of his influence on subsequent developments in Kashmir. He was a former schoolteacher, a close friend of Nehru, and a Muslim who was not sympathetic to the Muslim League. While serving as president of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, his advocacy that the maharajah should "quit Kashmir" resulted in his imprisonment in September 1946. The maharajah unexpectedly released him a year later, and he promptly began agitating for accession to India. Sheikh Abdullah became prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir during a reorganization in March 1948, and ruled the state, with the help of his associates, until August 1953.²⁰

¹⁹Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 16.

²⁰Brown, op. cit., pp. 183-190.

The cease-fire line, mentioned in chapter 2, was made effective on January 5, 1949, generally following the stabilized military front. It left India in control of the verdant Vale of Kashmir and the mountainous regions along the east and southeast which overlook West Pakistan's vital highway and railway route traversing the Indo-Gangetic plain.²¹ Pakistan controlled most of the mountainous areas to the northwest and a narrow strip of western Kashmir bordering Pakistan. Three-fourths of the population and most of the farming land of Kashmir lie on the Indian side of the line.²² All roads and railroads lead from Kashmir into Pakistan. There were no all-weather land routes between India and Kashmir until the military road was completed from Gurdaspur into Jammu.²³

The cease fire was accomplished in accordance with the provisions of a Security Council resolution which stipulated that after the cease fire and truce agreement had been implemented and plans for a plebiscite completed, the plebiscite would be conducted by an administrator nominated by the United Nations. It specified the withdrawal of Indian and Kashmir state military forces as well as Azad Kashmir and Pakistani forces. The resolution also made provision for guaranteed freedom of the people during the period of the plebiscite and specifically stated that the question of accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to either India or Pakistan would be

²¹Stephens, op. cit., pp. 213-214.

²²Wilber, op. cit., p. 308.

²³Platt, op. cit., p. 34.

decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. Both governments accepted the principles of the resolution.²⁴

Disagreements arose over the disposition of the Azad Kashmir forces and the jurisdiction of the Azad Kashmir government. India understood that the resolution intended that government to be dissolved, while Pakistan anticipated that it would remain in effect. There were also differences regarding synchronization of troop withdrawal.²⁵ Dr. Frank P. Graham was appointed as arbitrator, but his trip to Kashmir to arrange for demilitarization failed to meet with success.²⁶

Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan journeyed to Delhi in 1953 and conferred with Prime Minister Nehru regarding the Kashmir dispute. The two issued an announcement to the press on 20 August of that year stating generally that the matter should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. It further stated that the most feasible method of determining their wishes was by fair and impartial plebiscite and that the plebiscite administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954. When the United States announced on February 25, 1954, the agreement to give military aid to Pakistan, India expressed the view that this change in military balance placed the Kashmir affair in a different context

²⁴Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

²⁵Brown, op. cit., p. 191.

²⁶Hasan, op. cit., p. 147.

altogether. On May 14, 1954, the President of India issued an order, based on actions of a Kashmir Constituent Assembly, to the effect that the integration of Kashmir with India was complete.²⁷

Pakistan referred the issue to the Security Council in 1957, but resulting resolutions concerning demilitarization were opposed by both India and the USSR. Debate on the matter was resumed in the Council in April 1962 when a resolution was considered which included a reminder to India and Pakistan of earlier United Nations' resolutions and urged them to resume negotiations. United Kingdom's Krishna Menon, Defense Minister of India, advised the Council at that time that the accession of Kashmir to India was full, complete, and final. The resolution was subsequently vetoed by the USSR when presented in the Council for vote.²⁸

Throughout arguments and negotiations, both within and outside the United Nations, India maintained that she was in legal possession of the state as a result of accession. She labeled the entry of the tribesmen and Pakistan's assistance to them as hostile acts and the action of Pakistan's army as an invasion of India. Her position relative to demilitarization of Kashmir was that it should be accomplished in a fashion which would not compromise the security interests of India. The areas of the northwest and Azad Kashmir also should be under her control on the basis of accession, and

²⁷Brown, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

²⁸Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan Yesterday and Today, pp. 226-227.

forces in revolt against the legally constituted government should be disbanded and disarmed.²⁹

Pakistan's position was that the accession to India was illegal and void because the Hindu maharajah had acted without the confidence and support of his people and during the time when a standstill agreement with Pakistan was in effect.³⁰ Pakistan charged conspiracy and fraud in connection with the accession and proposed a prompt plebiscite in the belief that it would result in a decision favorable for Pakistan.³¹

An assessment of the purposes and actions of the two nations would probably show that each has pursued a policy in its own interest and has had a less than perfect case. India has opposed a plebiscite after having agreed that one would be conducted, and Pakistan has not been in a position to force one. On the other hand, Pakistan did condone the invasion of the tribesmen and later used its army in opposition to the Indian army.³²

Despite the indication of finality in the statement of Krishna Menon to the Security Council in 1962, negotiations were resumed by the two nations before the end of that year. This series was concluded in May 1963 with a communique which announced that the two sides had failed to reach agreement. The dispute was repeatedly debated in the Security Council during the following year without

²⁹Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

³⁰Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in *Major Governments of Asia*, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 518.

³¹Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 199.

significant developments; but on December 21, 1964, the President of India announced application to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian constitution. This action constituted a proclamation of presidential rule in Kashmir and official declaration that it was an integral part of the Indian state.³³

On the night of August 5, 1965, several thousand Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri "freedom fighters" crossed the cease fire line to foment a rebellion against India among the Muslim population. Local support, however, did not develop to the extent required. Pakistan denied for some time that any of its people were involved and claimed that the matter was entirely an internal affair. It was clear that she did not wish to precipitate a war with India, but by the middle of August both sides had committed troops, armor, and airpower.³⁴

U Thant, United Nations Secretary General, flew to Asia in September 1965, for conferences with leaders of both countries in an effort to make peace.³⁵ With the cooperation of both the United States and the Soviet Union, the Security Council issued an order to India and Pakistan directing that a cease fire take place on 23 September; and both nations complied.³⁶ Sporadic fighting continued only during the next few weeks.

³³US Dept of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Kashmir: A Chronology--1947-1965, pp. 13-14.

³⁴US Dept of Defense, Armed Forces Information and Education for Commanders, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," This Changing World, Vol. 5, No. 7, 1 Oct. 1965, pp. 3-4.

³⁵"New Threat of Big War: Red China Goes to the Brink," U.S. News and World Report, 27 Sep. 1965, pp. 38-39.

³⁶"How the United Nations Came Back to Life," U.S. News and World Report, 4 Oct. 1965, pp. 36-37.

This cessation of active combat leaves the basic problem unsolved, however. From the Indian viewpoint, the passage of time has occasioned additional complications which may transcend the principles related in the statement of her position on the matter. If the results of a plebiscite were unfavorable for India, it could possibly be viewed as constituting secession of Kashmir. This might well cause demands for secession to be made by other dissident groups such as the Nagas and Sikhs.³⁷ India also fears that angry Hindus might retaliate upon the 49 million Muslim inhabitants of India if Muslim Kashmir opted for Pakistan.³⁸ These considerations may have influenced her decision to invalidate the pledge for a plebiscite.

To Pakistan, the issue is still the questioned two-nation theory, its raison d'etre, plus valid economic and security arguments. Each nation considers its prestige is involved in this fateful issue for which there seems to be no easy solution. Kashmir has long ceased to be merely a dispute over a territory and has become the symbol of hope and aspiration of the two exclusive ideologies that confront each other.³⁹

³⁷"Worldgram from the Capitals of the World," U.S. News and World Report, 13 Sep. 1965, p. 67.

³⁸John E. Frazer, "Kashmir: Tenderbox of Asia," Reader's Digest, Dec. 1965, p. 96.

³⁹Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 240.

CHAPTER 6

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, USSR, AND COMMUNIST CHINA

The foreign policy of a country represents the sum of a number of factors, including emotion and attitude as well as material interest. It is not surprising that the first two of these factors are clearly recognizable in Pakistan's foreign policy, considering that its short history as an independent nation has been marked by almost continual struggles for the protection of its existence. India has constituted the major threat, so a preponderance of Pakistan's international actions appear to have been motivated by fear of India. Relations with all other countries came to be viewed on the basis of their effect on the dispute with India, and Pakistan demanded that its friends pledge themselves clearly in these disputes.¹

Friends were sorely needed during the first five critical years, but the Pakistanis were inexperienced in the ways of international intercourse and failed to demonstrate ability to convert benevolence into alliance. In a radio speech to the people of the United States in February 1948, Mr. Jinnah stated:

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill toward all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fairplay in

¹Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 12.

national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.²

This was certainly an appeal for friendship and is characteristic of the official Pakistani viewpoint at that time.

The initial search for friends was directed toward other nations with predominantly Muslim populations. Overtures were made to heads of government of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt, Syria, Malaya, Turkey, and Afghanistan; and a series of both official and unofficial conferences was held, intended to promote closer understanding between the Muslim peoples. Internal quarrels between these states, coupled with their own separate ambitions, precluded Islamic unity, however. Some of the major Muslim states were unwilling to support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue; and relations with Afghanistan rapidly deteriorated, primarily over claims for border adjustment. Afghanistan even supported India's position on Kashmir and initially opposed admission of Pakistan to the United Nations.³

Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries were unwilling to participate in the Kashmir issue so Pakistan turned to the United

²G. W. Choudhury and Parvez Hasan, Pakistan's External Relations, p. 6.

³Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan Yesterday and Today, pp. 227-232.

Nations. It received substantial sympathy there and a modicum of support as a result of India's qualification of her position regarding the plebiscite. Nevertheless, many Pakistanis concluded that decisive action could be obtained from the United Nations only where the interests of a major power were involved.⁴ Having by this time gained a small amount of experience in international affairs, the leaders of Pakistan evidently concluded during the early 1950's that they were in an era when national purposes could be best served through interdependence.⁵ Ever mindful of the military superiority of India, Pakistan turned to the West for necessary military and economic assistance.

Relations with the United States

The United States had shown little interest in Pakistan prior to 1953 and had been careful to avoid implication in the disputes between India and Pakistan.⁶ At the same time that Pakistan was ready to turn to the United States, however, the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was anxious to find Asian allies which would oppose communism.⁷ The Soviet Union and Communist China had massive military forces available across the northern limits of the

⁴Callard, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

⁵Choudhury and Hasan, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶Ibid., p. 24.

⁷Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, "Part Four: Pakistan" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin, p. 524.

subcontinent, and the forces which might be used to oppose any advance to the south were far from adequate.⁸

In an effort to strengthen the position of the free world in the Middle East, the United States suggested to other Western powers the establishment of a Middle East defense organization. When this proposal failed to receive support, consideration was given to a unilateral military pact between the United States and Pakistan.⁹ Mr. Dulles visited Pakistan in May 1953, and was favorably impressed with the attitude of its people and their potential ability to oppose communism.¹⁰ Pakistani leaders evidenced a substantial amount of reluctance to join the military arrangement, but this hesitation was overcome by United States assistance with a gift of 610,000 tons of wheat to alleviate a desperate food crisis in Pakistan. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed in May 1954,¹¹ and Pakistan received the first shipment of military equipment the following November.

Provisions of the agreement included that assistance was to be used exclusively for internal purposes and that Pakistan would not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation.¹² Public statements by representatives of both nations made it indisputable

⁸K. Sarwar Hasan, The Strategic Interests of Pakistan, p. 6.

⁹Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 316.

¹⁰Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 25.

¹¹Hasan, op. cit., p. 7.

¹²US Dept of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 5, Part 1, 1954, pp. 852-858.

that Pakistan was under no obligation to join the United States in a future war. Additionally, Pakistan's reply on May 4, 1954, to a Soviet protest against acceptance of American aid, explained that the agreement did not involve availability of military bases to the United States.¹³

Nevertheless, Pakistan had entered into a military compact with the United States indicating a distinct change in foreign policy. Continuing this trend, on September 8, 1954, Pakistan joined with seven other members of the United Nations, Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United States, and the United Kingdom, in the Southeast Asia Treat Organization (SEATO). This was followed the next year by participation in the Baghdad Pact, which subsequently evolved into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), comprising Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. All of these military alliances strengthened her ties with the United States to the extent that there was no longer much doubt regarding her sympathies or intentions.¹⁴

Pakistan seems to have seen in these alliances an opportunity for obtaining military and economic aid from the United States and for blocking the impending threat of Communist influence in the subcontinent. Of more importance, however, was the chance to weaken

¹³Hasan, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

¹⁴Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, Jan. 1964, p. 195.

the Indian threat to her existence. India ranked well ahead of any Communist power as the foremost enemy, and Pakistan unsuccessfully attempted to broaden the scope of the treaties to cover defense against any aggression.¹⁵

Public reaction in Pakistan to these alliances was not all favorable. Many Pakistanis felt that membership in the alliances had resulted in censure by the Arab and Asian world and enmity from the Communists, without providing compensatory security.¹⁶ This led them to expect something more from the United States than economic and military aid. Pakistan had not received sufficient moral and political support on that all-important foreign policy issue, the Kashmir dispute, to gain a favorable settlement. It, therefore, came to be politically advantageous to claim more support from the United States and to criticize it for any assistance given to nonaligned India. Arguments initially advanced, that the alliances would strengthen the country against India, were now subject to serious questioning.¹⁷

When the Communist Chinese military campaigns began against the Indian frontier during the fall of 1962, India requested and received immediate military assistance from the United States. Pakistani leaders were unsympathetic with India's position and expressed the opinion that an invasion was not imminent. Military

¹⁵"Dilemma for U.S.," New York Times, 12 Sep. 1965, p. 1E.

¹⁶Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, Fall 1962, p. 217.

¹⁷Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp. 26-27.

equipment provided to India tended to nullify advantages gained by Pakistan during previous years and incited strong criticism against the West, provoking threats of withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan continued to express friendship for the United States and reliance on proffered economic development aid; but trade agreements effected with Communist countries, beginning in 1963, manifested return to an independent foreign policy.¹⁸

Continuation of the independent policy and cultivation of friendly relations with Communist China progressed to the extent by early 1965, that United States-Pakistan relations could be accurately described as strained. The United States deferred a \$300 million aid commitment; and when the conflict between military forces of India and Pakistan in the border area of the Rann of Kutch was followed by fighting in Kashmir, it also suspended military assistance.¹⁹

When President Ayub Khan visited President Johnson in December 1965, he probably was seeking restoration of aid plus United States support on the Kashmir issue. Desires of the United States were reported to include relaxation of ties with Communist China, improved attitude toward United States policies in Vietnam, assurance that Kashmir conflict would not be resumed, and the use of Pakistani ports for shipment of wheat to India.²⁰

¹⁸Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, pp. 319-322.

¹⁹US Dept of Defense, Armed Forces Information and Education for Commander, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," This Changing World, Vol. 5, No. 7, 1 Oct. 1965, pp. 2-4.

²⁰"As World Leaders Come to LBJ: What They Ask, What They Offer," U.S. News and World Report, 27 Dec. 1965, pp. 22-23.

American leverage is severely limited, however. It seems clear that the official United States position in the India-Pakistan affair is such that if it were forced to make a choice, India would have preference. Its relative size and importance have made their impression.²¹ It could be expected that President Ayub and many other Pakistani leaders are aware of this situation as they continue the difficult struggle to obtain a favorable position among the nations of the world.

Relations with the USSR

During the early period of Pakistan's national history, while emphasis was being placed on gaining friendship and good will, relations with the Soviet Union manifested no specific trends. The two countries established diplomatic relations with each other in 1948, at the proposal of Pakistan, and experienced some cultural exchanges, with accompanying increases in trade, during most of the years to follow. Diplomatic relations prior to 1953 could be described as correct but neither warm nor friendly.²²

When Pakistan began participation in the military alliances, the USSR reacted quickly with sharp verbal attacks and notes of protest, all of which were rejected.²³ The Soviet Union then

²¹"Dilemma for U.S.," New York Times, 12 Sep. 1965, p. 1E.

²²Werner Levi, "Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, Fall 1962, pp. 211-215.

²³Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 319.

supported Afghanistan in its dispute with Pakistan over Pakhtunistan and took a firm position endorsing India's claim to Kashmir. As was noted previously, resolutions in the Security Council favorable to Pakistan's position were blocked by Soviet veto.²⁴ After the American U-2 plane had been brought down in the Soviet Union in May 1960, and its pilot captured, a Soviet note strongly protesting use of the base at Peshawar, Pakistan, was dispatched to the Pakistani government. The note attacked its participation in the incident and threatened retaliatory measures. Pakistan's reply denied any knowledge of the flight but protested flights of Soviet planes over West Pakistan.²⁵

Beginning in 1960, the USSR evidenced a desire for closer relations by pressing for trade agreements and extending offers for economic aid. This was at the approximate time when Pakistani criticisms of alliances with the West mounted to an influential level. In this improved diplomatic climate an agreement was signed with the Soviet Union whereby that country would provide \$30 million, together with equipment and technicians, for oil exploration in Pakistan.²⁶

There is still no obvious indication of significant improvement in relations with the USSR nor does it seem likely that a

²⁴K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, p. 76.

²⁵"Soviet Union-United States-The U-2 Incident," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 12, May 21-28, 1960, pp. 17429-17430.

²⁶Werner Levi, "Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, Fall 1962, pp. 217-218.

distinct change should be anticipated abruptly. Pakistan's pursuit of the more independent foreign policy does, however, permit the Soviet Union to attempt mediation in the subcontinent. Its success in organizing a conference in the USSR, with the Indian Prime Minister and the President of Pakistan, to seek solution of the Kashmir dispute, represents continued interest in the developments in that part of Asia.²⁷

Relations with Communist China

Pakistan began a friendly relationship with Communist China by recognizing the new government in 1950 and voting in favor of its membership in the United Nations. Formal diplomatic relations were established and ambassadors exchanged in 1951. Although Pakistan supported the United Nations action in Korea, it abstained on the resolution declaring China an aggressor.²⁸

The Asian-African Conference in 1955, known as the Bandung Conference, provided an opportunity for the two nations to discuss their differences and seek a common position. Since representatives of both countries joined in opposition to Pandit Nehru at that conference, it was convenient for them to engage in private discussions.²⁹ The result was apparent cooperation and understanding

²⁷Peter Grose, "Soviet Leader Flies to Talk on Kashmir," New York Times, 3 Jan. 1966, pp. 1, 12.

²⁸Werner Levi, "Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, Fall 1962, pp. 218-219.

²⁹Hasan, op. cit., pp. 69-74.

between Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan and Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China. Chou En-lai, expressing a viewpoint concerning SEATO, quite different from the Soviet position, declared in the conference that he did not regard Pakistan's membership in the alliance as indicative of aggressive designs but considered it a defensive measure which would not interfere with friendship toward China. In return, Mohammed Ali assured Chou En-lai that Pakistan did not deem his country an aggressive power.³⁰

This cordial atmosphere was maintained during subsequent years by periodic cultural exchanges and visits by officials. Furthermore, China had satisfied that all-important requirement for friendship by failure to recognize India's claim to Kashmir. This made possible the conclusion of an agreement with China which delineated the border on their common frontier in Kashmir, with the determining consideration generally being the river basins and water sheds serving the areas.³¹

Pakistan had proposed negotiations for the agreement in a formal note to Communist China on March 28, 1961. The Chinese reply specified that the terms should be provisional, pending settlement with India of the Kashmir dispute. India registered immediate objection by an announcement that it would not recognize any agreement concerning the border inasmuch as Pakistan was not in legal

³⁰Choudhury and Hasan, op. cit., p. 27.

³¹"Pakistan: Explosive Situation," Eastern World, Vol. 17, No. 5, May 1963, p. 22.

occupation of the territory involved. Matters were at this stage of development when the Chinese-Indian border conflict began.³²

Pakistan and China did sign an agreement on March 2, 1963, however, by which Pakistan gained 750 square miles of additional territory that had previously been under physical control of the Chinese.³³

Sino-Pakistani relations continued to show improvement during 1963 and 1964, as indicated by the signing of trade and barter agreements. Additionally, an air agreement provided Pakistan International Airlines with landing rights at Canton and Shanghai, while the Chinese received authorization to land at Karachi, Dacca, and Lahore.³⁴ China furthered its campaign to convince Pakistan of the value of their friendship by shifting to its complete support on the Kashmir issue. This was announced in a joint communique issued during Chou En-lai's official visit to Pakistan in February 1964.³⁵

Although Pakistan has strengthened her ties with China considerably in the last five years, there are indications that it has probably moved as far in that direction as it wishes to go. No concessions were made in return for the support on Kashmir. President Ayub reported that during a discussion of the differences

³²Werner Levi, "Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, Fall 1962, p. 220.

³³S. M. Burke, "Sino-Pakistani Relations," Orbis, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1964, pp. 395-396.

³⁴Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 321.

³⁵Burke, op. cit., pp. 398-401.

between China and the United States, in the course of Chou En-lai's 1964 visit, the Chinese leaders explained their difficulties and he had briefly expressed American views. Despite the trend toward an independent foreign policy, many of the more responsible Pakistani leaders can be expected to recognize that China cannot match the capability of Western countries to provide the military and economic assistance which their country urgently needs.³⁶ Louis Dupree predicted in 1963:

. . . Even if Pakistan adopts a policy of neutralism, it will not be anti-West, and will recognize the necessity of continued Western aid and technicians to counter Communist penetration.³⁷

³⁶Ibid., pp. 401-404.

³⁷Louis Dupree, A Note on Pakistan, p. 37.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysis

Despite numerous difficulties and unfavorable conditions which caused opponents of Pakistan and skeptics to predict that the new nation would not survive, it has demonstrated durability through its existence for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, it continues to be a developing nation with a low standard of living. Critical problems which currently restrict more rapid advances are population growth, educational limitations, and defense expenditures.

The government inherited a part of one of the most remarkable civil service systems in the world. It is federal and presidential in form and has enjoyed a relatively stable administration under President Ayub who exercises broad executive powers, including command of the military establishment.

Pakistan occupies a strategic position as it separates both the USSR and Communist China from the Arabian Sea and dominates the shipping route for Middle East oil. Its unique division into two zones separated by some 1,000 miles of Indian territory causes it to be vulnerable to attack from almost any direction. Occupation of Pakistan by Communist military forces would result in India being surrounded and the Middle East threatened.

Pakistan considers India to be its prime enemy and a threat to its existence. This has dominated its foreign affairs and its defense policy, and has affected its economic policy. It follows then that resolution of all differences with India and the establishment of close friendly relations could be expected to operate to Pakistan's advantage, provided the price of this arrangement were not exorbitant.

The attempt to force admission by India of the wisdom of the two-nation concept and to gain equal status with the larger country in international affairs represents an unrealistic approach which has hampered relationships with potentially friendly nations.

The United States has a special interest in Pakistan because of its strategic location and its membership in both SEATO and CENTO. It is in the interest of peace in Asia and the world that Pakistan be maintained as a strong and stable nation, free from significant Communist influence. For these reasons we have provided economic and military aid to assist in its struggle for economic development and its endeavor to achieve security.

This assistance made possible the amazing advances attained under the Second Five-Year Plan. Similarly, but perhaps to a lesser degree, United States military aid has enabled the army and air force to be maintained as efficient and comparatively modern military aid must be clear to the leaders of Pakistan; and some of

their actions, speeches, and writings support this assumption. Even though substantial aid is still required and sought, Pakistan has deliberately moved during the last three or four years from a position of close alliance and cooperation with the United States to a warm relationship with Communist China, our acknowledged enemy. Since the United States suffered this foreign relations' reversal while achieving such notable success with assistance programs, it seems indisputable that the discomfiture represents an unfortunate failure in diplomacy.

Even though the USSR appears to be taking advantage of this development by improving its attitude toward Pakistan, and Communist China may also attempt exploitation, neither of them have sufficient resources readily available to offer continued assistance on the scale needed by Pakistan to maintain its growth rates and standards of recent years.

Logical considerations would consequently indicate that Pakistan must obtain these favors from the United States, even if that entails changing her independent foreign policy. Alternatives available are either to make some arrangements for aid with the Communist countries or to accept, at least temporarily, gradual erosion of the economy. Leaders of Pakistan can be expected to recognize this logic, if their Third Five-Year Plan is a valid criterion, and to foresee diminishing returns from a further thrust to the left.

The administration must, however, maintain support from the people, who are prisoners of their past in that they are strongly affected by events of the last few hundred years. They may continue to measure success of their leaders in terms of advantages gained over, or lost to, India. If this situation is sufficiently appreciated in the United States and appropriate actions taken which enable Pakistani leaders to convince their people that cooperation with the West offers ample opportunity for future progress with dignity, then it may still be possible to maintain Pakistan as a staunch and dependable ally.

This action should not necessitate weakening of our position with India, but it does require that the United States demonstrate its acceptance of responsibility as a leader in world affairs by attempting to further its interests in the subcontinent and the whole of Asia. Defense and welfare of South Asia evidently depends on deciding the Kashmir issue--a matter which has long defied solution. Without favoring either India or Pakistan, but fully armed with knowledge of the history of the area and its people, the United States should attempt to help them resolve their differences. The Kashmir matter is one of the most important disputes facing the world today and has shown little attenuation with the passage of time. If we do not assist in the eradication of this irritant, then it remains to unfavorably affect our influence in the area or for use as a tool by one of the Communist nations.

Furthermore, we should continue furnishing economic and military assistance to Pakistan provided we receive assurances that they will not be used in contravention of our foreign policy. Except for the 1965 Kashmir conflict and indirectly related diplomatic losses, our international prestige has been enhanced by our relations with Pakistan. It is to our advantage to take reasonable and practical actions designed to reduce and prevent the influence of communism in the subcontinent.

By deferral of aid commitments, the United States has made clear its disapproval of closer ties with Communist China. Pakistan's failure to avail itself of opportunities for even better relations with China indicates a preference for orientation toward the West.

Pakistan began its history as an independent nation by desperately fighting to establish a viable economy and to provide security for its people. At stake was its very existence and, next in priority, its identity in South Asia and among the nations of the world. That existence is more assured now, but the search for identity, including friends and position, continues. It has been a determined and admirable search which still lacks promise of early success.

Conclusions


1. Pakistan has a stable government, a comparatively healthy economy, and an efficient army and air force.
2. Its location in a strategic position of the world causes it to be of importance to the United States and invites the attention of the USSR and Communist China.

3. United States economic and military aid enabled the significant progress in those areas made during the period of 1960 to 1965. Nevertheless, Pakistan will be dependent on foreign assistance for the next few years and perhaps longer.

4. The United States should continue to provide assistance after having obtained assurances that their utilization will not conflict with our foreign policy.

5. The United States has experienced a diplomatic failure in its relations with Pakistan during the last four or five years. Because of our position of world leadership and our interests in Asia, we should attempt to assist in resolution of the challenging Kashmir issue.

6. Leaders of Pakistan prefer orientation toward the West. Accordingly, the future international relations of that country can be substantially influenced by pertinent United States foreign policy.


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Colonel Arty

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